The White House is betting that the Hormuz crisis will redefine U.S. leverage over global energy for years, even if today’s pump prices hurt its own voters. The threats over Iranian oil routes are not just about reopening the strait; they are about who sets the rules for the next decade.
Trump’s threats over Iranian oil routes signal a larger election-year energy gamble
After Iran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz in late February 2026 in response to U.S.-Israeli military strikes, President Trump threatened to hit key Iranian oil infrastructure, including Kharg Island, if Tehran did not drop its chokehold on the waterway. As CBS News has reported, the Iran war has kept the Strait paralyzed and gas prices on the rise, and the administration’s rhetoric has escalated in step. Trump has appealed to allies, including the UK, France, Japan, and China, to send warships to help secure the strait and restore shipping. Behind the immediate crisis lies a strategic calculation: the White House is using the Hormuz showdown to assert and extend U.S. influence over how and where the world’s oil flows, even if short-term price spikes damage Republican prospects in the November midterms. The gamble is that in five years, not five days, the story will be American energy dominance and a Middle East where Washington sets the terms.
In the short term, the political cost is real. According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll in March 2026, only 29% of Americans approved of the Iran strikes, and 67% expected gasoline prices to keep rising. Gas prices surged by roughly 50 to 60 cents per gallon after the conflict began; the national average reached $3.25 to $3.32 per gallon. Reuters and CNBC have reported that rising gas prices from the Iran war imperil Trump’s Republican majority in Congress, and that the 2026 midterms were already framed around an affordability crisis. Just weeks earlier, in his State of the Union address, Trump had touted falling gas prices as an economic achievement and described high prices under his predecessor as a disaster; now the same metric was moving against him. Trump himself said of gas prices during the Iran operation, “if they rise, they rise,” and ruled out tapping the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles reportedly warned internally that failure to address rising prices would be “catastrophic” for Republicans. So the administration is tolerating short-term pain at the pump in exchange for a longer-term reordering of energy leverage. The question is whether voters will still be listening in five years if they are paying at the pump today.
The long-game logic rests on a shift in how Washington views energy power. Analyses from the Atlantic Council and others have framed “energy dominance” as having evolved beyond domestic production to encompass control over global energy assets, strategic chokepoints, and energy flows. The U.S. transformation from a major importer to one of the world’s largest oil and gas producers allows it to pressure rivals through energy sanctions and to influence the cost and security of global energy flows. The IEA has projected that the U.S. will account for 85% of the world’s oil production growth and 30% of natural gas growth through 2030; OPEC and Russia’s combined share of global oil production is expected to fall. In that context, the Hormuz crisis is not only a tactical problem to be solved but a moment to demonstrate that the U.S. can and will use military and diplomatic means to keep critical energy routes open on terms that favor Washington and its allies. Trump’s threats over Iranian oil infrastructure are part of that demonstration: if Tehran can shut the strait, the U.S. can threaten the infrastructure that funds the regime. The message to allies and adversaries alike is that American energy policy is now inseparable from American security policy, and that the next five years will be shaped by who controls the chokepoints and the flows.
Domestically, the administration has tried to have it both ways. Reuters reported in March 2026 that the White House was seeking bolder action on energy prices amid the Iran conflict; senior officials requested federal agencies to provide policy options Trump could implement without Congress, including potential federal gasoline tax holidays and looser environmental regulations. The Treasury Department explored using the oil futures market to combat price spikes. So behind the public “if they rise, they rise” stance, there was private recognition that voter tolerance has limits. The bet is that the conflict will be resolved or contained before Election Day, that prices will fall, and that the narrative will shift to U.S. resolve and long-term energy security. If that bet fails, the same voters who feel the Hormuz crisis at the pump today may punish the party that asked them to wait five years for the payoff.
Allies and the strait: who pays for the long game?
Trump’s appeal to the UK, France, Japan, and China to send warships to help defend the Strait of Hormuz from Iran’s attacks is a piece of the same long game. It spreads the military and political cost of keeping the waterway open while reinforcing the idea that the U.S. leads a coalition that can secure global energy flows. As the American Action Forum and others have noted, the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran and Iran’s retaliation have disrupted roughly 15 million barrels per day of crude production and 4.5 million barrels per day of refined fuels; Asia sources about 60% of its crude imports from the Middle East and is hit hardest. So when Washington asks allies to contribute naval assets, it is also asking them to buy into a order where the U.S. sets the terms of energy security. The risk for the administration is that those same allies, and U.S. voters, remember the short-term price spike and the political cost more vividly than the strategic narrative. The Hormuz crisis is a test of whether the long game can survive the next election cycle.
What happens if the bet fails?
If gas prices stay high through the summer and into November, or if the conflict drags on with no clear victory, the “five years not five days” framing collapses. Voters do not cast ballots on 2030 energy dominance; they cast ballots on the price at the pump and the cost of living. Reuters and NBC News have reported that Iran strikes risk more voter frustration on the economy and that Republicans are already struggling to message on affordability. Trump has said he believes prices will drop “lower than even before” once the conflict ends, but analysts have warned that elevated fuel prices could persist for weeks or months even if the fighting stops. The election-year energy gamble is that the conflict will be short, prices will fall, and the story will be resolve rather than pain. If the opposite happens, the White House’s attempt to use the Hormuz showdown to redefine U.S. leverage over global energy will be remembered as the moment it lost the voters it asked to tolerate the short term.
What This Actually Means
The White House is using the Hormuz showdown to redefine U.S. leverage over global energy, even if short-term price spikes damage its own voters. Trump’s threats over Iranian oil routes are a signal that the administration is playing a long game: in five years, the story is meant to be American energy dominance and a Middle East where Washington sets the terms. The risk is that voters judge the administration on the price at the pump today, not on the strategic dividend in 2030. The election-year energy gamble is that they will not.
What is Kharg Island and why does Trump threaten it?
Kharg Island is Iran’s main oil export terminal in the Persian Gulf, handling roughly 90% of Iran’s seaborne crude exports. It has been a target in past conflicts and has come under threat in the current crisis. When Trump or his administration threaten to hit Kharg or other Iranian oil infrastructure if Tehran does not drop its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, the message is that the U.S. can impose reciprocal pain: if Iran closes the strait and hurts global oil flows, the U.S. can strike the facilities that fund the Iranian state. The threat is part of the broader escalation around the 2026 Hormuz crisis and fits the administration’s framing of energy as a tool of coercion and leverage.
What is the Strategic Petroleum Reserve?
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is a U.S. government stockpile of crude oil held in underground salt caverns in Texas and Louisiana. It was established in the 1970s to cushion the economy against major supply disruptions. The president can order a drawdown in an emergency; releases have been used during hurricanes, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2022 price spike. In March 2026, when gas prices surged after the Iran conflict, Trump ruled out tapping the SPR, signaling that he was willing to absorb short-term price pain rather than use the reserve to ease voter pressure. That decision underscored the administration’s bet that the Hormuz crisis would be resolved quickly and that the long-term gain from redefining U.S. energy leverage was worth the short-term cost at the pump.
How has U.S. energy dominance changed in the last five years?
Over the past decade and a half, the U.S. has become the world’s largest oil producer and a major natural gas exporter. The shale revolution drove U.S. oil supply up by roughly 140% from 2009 to 2023; in 2024 the U.S. set its seventh consecutive world record for oil output, producing about 4.84 billion barrels and roughly 40% more than Saudi Arabia. U.S. crude exports in 2024 were about 14 times higher than in 2014. The IEA expects the U.S. to account for 85% of global oil production growth and 30% of natural gas growth through 2030, while OPEC and Russia’s share of global oil production is projected to fall. That shift has given Washington leverage: it can use sanctions, diplomacy, and military posture to influence global energy flows and the cost of energy for rivals and allies. The Hormuz crisis is a test of whether that leverage extends to the world’s most critical oil chokepoint.
Sources
CBS News, Reuters, Reuters, CNBC, Reuters, Atlantic Council, American Action Forum, Reuters