The story is usually framed as Trump’s doing: paramilitary-style operations, federal agents in tactical gear, tear gas and shootings. The real cost is borne by democratic stability and by every voter and institution that depends on non-violent political norms. When paramilitary violence becomes a campaign feature, the losers are not only the communities in the crosshairs but the unwritten rules that keep politics from turning into open conflict. The New Republic has documented how the Trump administration brought American paramilitary violence home. Who benefits is clear; who loses is everyone else.
Paramilitary Violence as a Campaign Feature Puts Democratic Stability at Risk
The Department of Homeland Security’s “Operation Metro Surge” in Minneapolis and “Operation Midway Blitz” in Chicago deployed thousands of armed federal agents in tactical gear with military-grade firearms. According to The New Republic, masked agents used chemical weapons in predominantly immigrant neighbourhoods; tear gas was fired at students during school dismissal. Minneapolis city council member Renee Good was killed by an ICE agent in March 2026. A Venezuelan immigrant was shot in the leg by a federal agent in January, triggering widespread protests. City officials described the situation as a militarised occupation. This is not law enforcement as traditionally understood; it is paramilitary violence deployed on American soil, and it has become a visible part of the political landscape.
The Trump administration has treated ICE as a force multiplier for immigration enforcement without the constraints that usually apply to domestic policing. Senator Adam Schiff’s office reported in February 2026 that ICE and Customs and Border Protection had approved at least $144 million in weapons contracts since the start of the second Trump administration—a fourfold increase for ICE and a doubling for CBP compared to 2024. The contracts include thousands of AR-style rifles, handguns, ammunition, and non-lethal weapons. NBC News and Schiff’s report describe the administration as building a heavily armed domestic force with inadequate vetting and training. Gun manufacturers received a record $120.7 million through DHS contracts in 2025, the highest in at least ten years, according to The Trace. The machinery of paramilitary enforcement is being funded and expanded while the story stays focused on Trump and his critics. The institutions that are supposed to restrain executive violence—Congress, courts, civilian oversight—are the ones that lose when the frame is only “Trump did this.”
Voters and Institutions That Depend on Non-Violent Norms Are the Real Losers
Research on political violence and democracy shows that the normalisation of violence is the most consequential threat. A UC Davis study cited by Democratic Erosion found that 20.5% of Americans believe political violence is justifiable and 18.7% believe violence is needed to “protect democracy.” When paramilitary operations become a campaign feature, that normalisation accelerates. Voter suppression and intimidation do not require a formal paramilitary; they require the perception that the state can deploy force against political opponents or marginalised communities. Johns Hopkins work on the effect of political violence on American democracy identified electoral processes as the highest threat, with experts concerned that U.S. electoral systems have high potential to break down. The losers are voters who stay home, candidates who withdraw, and election workers who quit—and the democratic norm that politics is resolved by ballots, not force.
The Conversation and scholars such as Erica De Bruin note that only four democracies have created paramilitary police squads since 1960, and ICE may be counted among them. When ICE functions as what politicians have called “a personal paramilitary unit to the president,” the line between law enforcement and political instrument blurs. Foreign Affairs scholar Gustavo Flores-Macías warns that militarising domestic law enforcement follows a Latin American pattern: temporary emergency measures become permanent, executive power concentrates, and civil liberties erode. The cost is borne by democratic stability—the expectation that the state will not deploy military-style force against its own citizens for political or ideological ends.
Who Benefits When the Story Is Framed as Trump’s Doing
Framing the story as “Trump brought paramilitary violence home” is accurate, but it also lets everyone else off the hook. The New Republic is right to name the administration. The benefit to Trump and his coalition is visibility and deterrence: communities learn that resistance can be met with force. The benefit to opponents is a clear villain. The loss is that democratic institutions—Congress, the courts, the press, and the public—are not forced to ask who authorised the spending, who signed the contracts, and who will be held accountable when the next operation goes wrong. As long as the story is Trump’s doing, the deeper story—that paramilitary violence has become a campaign feature and that democratic stability is the casualty—stays in the background.
What This Actually Means
Paramilitary violence as a campaign feature is not only a Trump story. It is a story about who loses when the state deploys military-style force domestically and when that deployment is normalised. The real losers are voters and institutions that depend on non-violent political norms. The way to resist that outcome is to keep the focus on democratic stability: on oversight, on accountability, and on the norm that politics is not war. The New Republic has done necessary work in documenting what is happening. The next step is to make sure the cost to democratic stability—not just the cost to one administration’s reputation—stays at the centre of the story.
What Is Paramilitary Violence in a Domestic Context?
In a domestic context, paramilitary violence refers to the use of military-style force—tactical gear, military-grade weapons, coordinated multi-site operations—by agencies that are not the regular armed forces but that operate with similar equipment, training, and posture. Scholars distinguish between formal paramilitary police units and informal armed groups; ICE has been described as meeting many definitions of a paramilitary force. The key is that such forces blur the line between law enforcement and military action, often with weak civilian oversight. When they are deployed against communities or in ways that intimidate political participation, the result is paramilitary violence as a feature of domestic politics—and the cost is borne by democratic stability.
Sources
The New Republic, Senator Schiff, NBC News, The Conversation, Democratic Erosion, Foreign Affairs